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Summary of abbreviations used 
 
1. “Act” means Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
2. “Broomberg” means Advocate Eddie Broomberg, S.C. 
3. “CIR” means the Commissioner for Inland Revenue 
4. “D Clegg” means Advocate David Clegg  
5. “Commissioner” means the Commissioner for SARS 
6. “Companies Act” means the Companies Act No 61 of 1973 (as amended) 
7. “GAAR” means the General Anti-Avoidance Rule 
8. “Income Tax Act” means Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
9. “IRC” means the Inland revenue Commissioner 
10 “Ltd” means Limited 
11. “Meyerowitz” means Advocate David Meyerowitz, S.C. 
12. “Predecessor” means section 103(1) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
13. “Pty” means Private 
14. “SARS” means the South African Revenue Services 
15. “Section 80A-80L” means Section 80A-80L of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
16. “Section 103(1)” means Section 103(1) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
17. “Silke” means Silke on South African Income Tax 
18. “SCA” means the Supreme Court of Appeal 
19. “SIR” means the Secretary for Inland Revenue 
20. “UK” means the United Kingdom 
21. “US” means the United States of America 
22. “VAT” means Value Added Tax 
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1. Introduction 
 
For many years tax evasion and tax avoidance have been popular and controversial 
topics, not only in South Africa, but all over the world.  As early as the 17th century, 
England imposed a tax on horses which led people to ride tax-free cows.1 
The current economic recession has played a significant role in the continued focus 
on tax avoidance.  SARS is continually trying to reduce the impact of tax avoidance 
and tax evasion on the tax revenue collections, whilst the taxpayer is struggling to 
survive financially.  Faced daily with rising living costs, people have become more 
reluctant to part with their hard earned money.  However, tax evasion and tax 
avoidance ‘undermines the achievement of the public finance objective of collecting 
revenues in an efficient, equitable and effective manner’2 and therefore is 
‘economically undesirable and inequitable’.3  
It is important to differentiate between tax evasion and tax avoidance.  Tax evasion 
is the use of illegal means to reduce a tax liability.4  An attempt to evade tax is a 
criminal offence punishable under section 104(1) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
by a fine, imprisonment or both; additional tax of up to 200% may be payable as 
well as interest.5  Tax avoidance is where the taxpayer orders his affairs in a legal 
manner to pay the least amount of tax possible.6 
There is, however, a distinction between someone who orders his affairs so that he 
has no income which would expose him to the liability of income tax, and that of 
one who orders his affairs so that he escapes from liability for tax which he ought to 
pay on income which in reality is his.7  
It is common law that a taxpayer may arrange his affairs in order to pay fewer 
taxes.8  A taxpayer can donate an interest bearing investment, under a R100 000, to 
his major child and not pay donations tax or be affected by section 7(3) of the 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962.9 
 
                                                          
1
 Matsheru, M. 1991. Income Tax made Simple. Ch. 12. 
2
 Garg, R. 2012. Removing the fences: Looking through GAAR at 8. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Haupt, P. 2012. Notes on South African Income Tax. Ch. 17 at 499.   
5
 Broomberg, E.B. 2012. Evasion v avoidance at 104. 
6
 Van Schalkwyk, L.  2011. Silke: South African Income Tax. Ch. 25 at 727. 
7
 CIR v King 1947 (2) SA 196 (A), 14 SATC 184 at 194. 
8
 Matsheru, M. 1991. Income Tax made Simple. Ch. 12. 
9
 Van Schalkwyk, L. 2011. Silke: South African Income Tax. Ch. 25 at 727. 
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In Duke of Westminster10 it was held that: 
‘the taxpayer is entitled to create a situation by entering into a transaction 
which would attract tax consequences for which the Act makes a specific 
provision and that the validity of the transaction is not affected merely 
because the tax consequences which it attracts are advantageous to the 
taxpayer and he enters into the transaction deliberately with a view to 
gaining that advantage.’   
However not all lawful tax avoidance arrangements are permissible in terms of the 
Income Tax Act.  
The legislature enacted South Africa’s first GAAR in 1941, to define and limit 
impermissible tax avoidance arrangements.  Section 90 of the Income Tax Act 31 of 
1941 was later replaced by section 103(1) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
In 2005, SARS proposed amendments to enhance the effectiveness in eliminating 
impermissible tax avoidance agreements.11  It was the view of SARS that section 
103(1) contained certain ‘inherent weaknesses’.12 Revised proposals in October 
2006 included new provisions to ensure a GAAR broad enough to prevent complex 
tax avoidance arrangements.  The aim was to achieve a balance between the need 
for a strong and effective GAAR, and in contrast, the certainty of taxpayers involved 
in bona fide business activities.13 
Section 103(1) was accordingly repealed by section 36(1)(a) of the Revenue Laws 
Amendment Act 2006 and replaced by a new GAAR found in section 80A-80L of the 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962.14  
As there has been no relevant case law since the introduction of the new GAAR, 
there is a level of uncertainty within the business world regarding the potential 
impact on sound commercial transactions, which was also a weakness of its 
predecessor. 
For a GAAR to be effective, it is important to have a clearly drafted rule that 
provides the taxpayer, SARS and the judicial system with certainty.   
This dissertation is therefore aimed at exploring the effectiveness of the current 
legislation in comparison to its predecessor, by analysing the requirements as set 
out in section 80A read together with relevant sections. 
                                                          
10
 (1936) 51 TLR 467. 
11
 SARS. 2006. Tax Avoidance and Section 103 of the Income Tax Act, 1962: Revised Proposals at 2. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Van Schalkwyk, L., Geldenhuys, B. 2009. Meditari Accountancy Research at 167. 
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2. The General Anti Avoidance Rule requirements 
  
Section 80A refers to an impermissible tax avoidance arrangement.  This confirms 
that not all tax avoidance arrangements are prohibited in terms of the GAAR. 
To constitute an impermissible avoidance arrangement ALL four of the below listed 
requirements have to be met in terms of section 80A of the Income Tax Act 58 of 
1962: 
 There must be an arrangement as defined in Section 80L; 
 The arrangement results in a tax benefit and constitutes an avoidance 
arrangement entered into on or after 2nd of November 2006; 
 The sole or main purpose of the avoidance arrangement is to obtain a tax 
benefit; 
 Any one of the following tainted elements is present (abnormality element): 
 Abnormality regarding means and manner. 
 A lack of commercial substance in whole or in part. 
 Creating abnormal rights or obligations. 
 Leading to the misuse or abuse of the provisions of the Income Tax 
Act. 
All four requirements will be critically analysed in sections 3 to 6. 
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3. An arrangement as defined in section 80L 
 
The first requirement to be met in terms of the GAAR is that there must be an 
‘arrangement’ as defined in Section 80L.  In this section I will discuss what 
constitutes an ‘arrangement’. 
The term ‘arrangement’ is new to the GAAR.  This term is found in foreign GAAR’s 
like China, Ireland and New Zealand.15 
AP de Koker16 submits that the term ‘arrangement’: 
‘…has been interpreted as requiring a conscious involvement of two or more 
participants who arrive at an understanding.  It cannot exist in a vacuum and 
presuppose a meeting of minds, which embodies an expectation by each that 
the other will act in a particular way.’ 
It therefore means that the GAAR will find application where there is consensus 
between two or more parties to an ‘arrangement’. 
The predecessor of the section 80A, section 103(1) read as follows: 
‘…(1) Where any transaction, operation or scheme (whether entered into or carried 
out before or after the commencement of this Act, and including a transaction, 
operation and scheme involving the alienation of property) has been entered into or 
carried out which has the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for any tax, duty 
or levy on income (including any such tax, duty or levy imposed by a previous Act), or 
of reducing the amount thereof, and which in the opinion of the Secretary, having 
regard to the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme was 
entered into or carried out -’. 
Section 80L defines an ‘arrangement’ as: 
 ‘… any transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding, whether 
enforceable or not, including all steps therein or parts thereof, and includes any of 
the foregoing involving the alienation of property.’ 
It is clear from the above comparison that the legislature expanded the GAAR by 
introducing various new components and implementing a very detailed definition.  
The definition was expanded by including the terms ‘agreement’ and 
‘understanding’, ‘whether enforceable or not’ and affirming that it will now also 
apply to steps and parts of an ‘arrangement’.   
                                                          
15
 PWC. 2012. Tax Controversy and Dispute Resolution Alert at 12. 
16
 De Koker, A.P. 2012. Silke on South African Income Tax. Ch. 19.36. 
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The different components of the term ‘arrangement’ as defined in section 80L, will 
be discussed in sections 3.1 to 3.5. 
3.1. Transaction, operation, scheme, agreement and understanding 
The Income Tax Act does not define the terms: ‘transaction’, ‘operation’, ‘scheme’, 
‘agreement’ and ‘understanding’. 
The words ‘transaction’, ‘operation’ and ‘scheme’ were also found in the revoked 
section 103(1) and the established judicial principles will continue to apply as no 
new case law is found and there has not been any considerable changes to the 
definition. 
In Meyerowitz v CIR17 it was stipulated by the court that the term ‘scheme’ is a wide 
term covering a series of transactions.  In CIR v Louw18  it was found that the term 
‘scheme’ is wide enough to cover situations in which later steps i  a course of 
action were left unresolved at the outset. 
The terms ‘agreement’ and ‘understanding’ are new components and the meaning 
and scope of these terms must still be determined by the courts.  
AP de Koker19 described an ‘understanding’ as ‘the meeting of minds’.  It means 
there needs to be consensus between the parties. 
According to SARS20 these terms include any form of side letter, moral obligation 
under the so-called gentlemen’s agreement, and letters of wishes.  It should further 
be interpreted to include verbal, written and tacit agreements or understandings.21   
It would be my submission that the terms provided in section 80L overlap each 
other in definition.  The common characteristic found in a transaction, operation, 
scheme, agreement and understanding is an element of consensus.  The insertion of 
the terms ‘agreement’ and ‘understanding’ is unnecessary as it does not contribute 
to expanding the scope of an ‘arrangement’ in view of the fact that the courts have 
established the term ‘scheme’ has a wide scope and covers almost every form of 
‘arrangement’.     
 
 
 
                                                          
17
 1963 (3) SA 863 (A), 25 SATC 287 at 300. This was confirmed in CIR v Louw 1983 (3) SA 551 (A) 45 
SATC 113. 
18
 1983 (3) SA 551 (A) 45 SATC 113. 
19
 De Koker, A.P. 2012. Silke on South African Income Tax. Ch 19.36. 
20
 SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule, at 14 
21
 Ibid. 
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3.2. Whether enforceable or not 
The phrase ‘whether enforceable or not’ inserted by the legislature in the definition 
of ‘arrangement’ was not present in section 103(1). 
SARS provides a non-exhaustive list of agreements to be considered an 
‘arrangement’ which are not normally legally enforceable:22 
 An agreement between parties to agree in future on reasonable terms 
and condition to effect a merger; 
 The gentleman’s agreement; 
 Heads of agreement between parties which sets out the intended result 
the parties wish to achieve but not necessarily binding at the time; and 
 An agreement binding in honour only, binding only in conscience, letter of 
intent. 
It is therefore clearly not required that an agreement should be legally enforceable 
for it to be regarded as an ‘arrangement’.23   
It is suggested that it is irrelevant whether an agreement is a written document, 
containing all necessary essentials, or whether it simply creates a verbal 
understanding of any proposed future acts.24  It could still constitute an 
‘arrangement’.  
It is unclear how this phrase contributes to the definition as it will still be difficult to 
show the existence of an ‘arrangement’ where unenforceable methods, for example 
verbal arrangements, are used by parties, regardless of the inclusion of the phrase.   
3.3. Steps or parts  
Section 80L concludes that the GAAR applies to all steps or parts of an 
‘arrangement’.  The phrase is not defined in the Income Tax Act and it is suggested 
that each ‘connotes a distinct transactional element of the whole’.25  In terms of 
section 80H, the Commissioner can apply the GAAR to each such step or part of an 
arrangement.26 
This is a new addition to the definition of an ‘arrangement’. 
In CIR v Conhage27 the court held that where a taxpayer can demonstrate that the 
dominant reason for entering into a merged transaction was not to obtain a tax 
                                                          
22
 SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule, at 14. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Clegg, D., Stretch, R. 2012. Income Tax in South Africa. Ch. 26.3.2. 
25
 De Koker, A.P. 2012. Silke on South African Income Tax. Ch. 19.36. 
26
 Clegg, D., Stretch, R. 2012. Income Tax in South Africa. Ch. 26.3.2. 
27
 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA), 61 SATC 391 at 393. 
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benefit, the GAAR would not be invoked.28  However, it must also be shown that    
there would not have been any transaction at all, if not for the non-tax purpose.29     
In Meyerowitz v CIR30 the court found the test to be whether the different steps 
appear to be so connected that they could ultimately lead to tax avoidance.  It is of 
no significance if a taxpayer develops the intention to avoid tax in later steps.31  This 
was confirmed in CIR v Louw32 where the court further held that there ‘must be 
some unity amongst the various steps’.  The Louw-judgment stressed the 
importance of considering whether an individual step might be vulnerable to attack 
under the GAAR.33 
Where a composite transaction was entered into, a single agreement could 
constitute a scheme in terms of section 103(1) Trollip JA held:34 
“That does not mean, however, that the… agreement must be looked at with 
blinkers on…have regard to the circumstances under which the transaction, 
operation or scheme is entered into…” 
However, the purpose of a step in, or part of an arrangement, may differ from the 
purpose attributable to the arrangement as a whole.35  The phrase, ‘steps or parts’, 
was inserted to overcome the above established case law.36  A step or part with the 
sole or main purpose of obtaining a tax benefit may thus no longer be ‘camouflaged 
by a legitimate purpose of the arrangement as a whole’.37 
This phrase was aimed at tax driven, abnormal steps, lacking a commercial purpose, 
and misuse or abuse the provisions of the Act.38  This would be where a 
transactional element has been inserted mainly for a tax benefit.39  The 
Commissioner could then ignore the sole or main purpose of the arrangement when 
considering the purpose of a step.  The GAAR would then only apply to that step 
where all requirements are satisfied.   
SARS could potentially invoke the GAAR on a step of an ‘arrangement’ which seems 
driven by a tax benefit, irrespective of it being essential to the agreement as a 
whole, which lacks a main tax avoidance purpose. 
                                                          
28
 Clegg, D., Stretch, R. 2012. Income Tax in South Africa. Ch. 26.3.2. 
29
 CIR v Conhage 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA), 61 SATC 391 at 393. 
30
 1963 (3) SA 324 (A), 25 SATC 287 at 299. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 1983 (3) SA 551 (A), 45 SATC 113 at 122. 
33
 Emslie, 2001. T.S. Income Tax Cases and Materials at 960. 
34
 Hicklin v SIR 1980 (1) SA 481 (A), 41 SATC 179 at 192. 
35
 SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule at 15. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 SARS Explanatory Memorandum at 65. 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 Clegg, D., Stretch, R. 2012. Income Tax in South Africa. Ch. 26.3.2. 
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It would be my submission that the application should be limited to situations 
where a step is immaterial to the agreement or abnormal.  D Clegg suggests 
correctly that the question should be whether the particular step is commercially 
necessary in achieving the intended final commercial result, or whether it could be 
dispensed with without affecting the commercial end result.40 
3.4. Alienation of property 
An ‘arrangement’ involving the ‘alienation of property’ was specifically included.41  
The reasons for this inclusion were partly to counter the effect of the King-
judgment42 and to cover the frequent occurrence of property arrangements using 
tax aggressive methods.43  In CIR v King44 it was held that the expectation of a 
dividend attached to a share, when alienated with the share, must be regarded as 
capital and not income.  The court further held that:  
‘The expectation of a dividend attached to a share is an attribute of the share 
which may enhance its temporary value but it cannot for that reason be 
regarded as income.’45 
The transaction therefore did not have the effect of avoiding tax and is therefore 
not a transaction as defined.46  The GAAR could therefore not find application.   
3.5. General 
The exact meaning of the terms held in section 80L is yet to be established and it 
does not appear that the new additions to the definition of an ‘arrangment’ will 
significantly contribute to the success of the definition.  Therefore it would be my 
submission that there is no substantial change to the definition and the legislature 
failed to create more clarity, which was a weakness in the predecessor.  
Before an arrangement will attract the application of the GAAR, three more 
requirements have to be met.  The arrangement must result in a tax benefit, it must 
be the sole or main purpose of such arrangement to obtain a tax benefit and it 
requires the presence of an abnormality element.  
 
 
                                                          
40
 Clegg, D., Stretch, R. 2012. Income Tax in South Africa. Ch. 26.3.2. 
41
 Section 80L. 
42
 CIR v King 1947 (2) SA 196 (A). (Cited in SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General Anti-
Avoidance Rule at 14). 
43
 SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule at 14. 
44
 CIR v King 1947 (2) SA 196 (A), 14 SATC 184 at 196. 
45
 CIR v King 1947 (2) SA 196 (A), 14 SATC 184 at 196 -7. 
46
 Ibid. 
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4. The tax benefit 
The second requirement to be met in terms of the GAAR is that the arrangement 
should result in a tax benefit.  Where an arrangement results in a tax benefit it 
constitutes an ‘avoidance arrangement’.47  
A tax benefit is any avoidance, postponement or reduction of any liability for the 
payment of any tax, duty or levy imposed by the Act48 or by any other Act 
administered by the Commissioner.49  Taxes included are normal and donations tax, 
as well as secondary tax on companies.  Examples of other Acts administered by the 
Commissioner are the Estate Duty-, Value-added Tax- and Transfer Duty Acts.50  An 
arrangement therefore implemented for the sole or main purpose of avoiding 
estate duty, or any other tax administered by the Commissioner such as VAT or 
Transfer Duty, can be attacked if its effect is also to avoid tax levied in terms of the 
Income Tax Act. 
The meaning of a ‘tax benefit’ has been considered judicially, and established case 
law would still apply.51 
In Smith v CIR52 the court explained that a ‘tax benefit’ means that the taxpayer gets 
‘out of the way, escapes or prevents an anticipated liability’.   
In Hicklin v SIR53 it was said that the anticipated liability for tax can ‘vary from an 
imminent certain prospect to some vague, remote possibility’. 
Section 80F , which relates to connected persons and accommodating or tax-
indifferent parties, plays a role when determining a tax benefit.  In terms of the 
related section, the Commissioner may treat connected persons in relation to each 
other and accommodating or tax-indifferent parties, as one and the same person, 
and disregard any accommodating or tax-indifferent parties.  A tax liability will 
therefore still arise where an existing income stream was shifted to a connected 
person. 
In CIR v King54 the court concluded that a ‘tax benefit’ exists where a transaction 
results in reducing income to less than it was in the past or freeing the taxpayer 
from taxation on part of his future income.  The court further cited numerous 
ordinary and legitimate transactions whereby the taxpayer reduces his income and 
                                                          
47
 Section 80L.  
48
 Section 1 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
49
 Section 80L. 
50
 Meyerowitz, D. 2008. Meyerowitz on Income Tax: Ch. 29.3 at 5. 
51
 SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule at 16. 
52
 1964 (1) SA 324 (A), 26 SATC 1 at 12.  
53
 1980 (1) SA 481 (A), 41 SATC 179 at 193. 
54
 14 SATC 184 at 191. 
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thereby reduced his tax liability.55  An example is where a taxpayer sells his 
investments and buys shares producing no income, or giving it away to the poor.56  
The court, correctly it is submitted, held that the legislature could not have 
intended such absurdity.57      
The Income Tax Act does not provide a test to determine the existence of a tax 
benefit, but the test used by the courts are the ‘but for’ test.  The test simple askes 
whether, but for the existence of a transaction, would tax have been suffered?58 
It is confirmed in the cases, ITC 162559 and CIR v Louw60 that the courts applied the 
interpretation of whether ‘the taxpayer would have suffered tax but for the 
transaction’ to determine the existence of a ‘tax benefit’.  The Commissioner bears 
the onus to show, on a balance of probabilities, that a tax benefit has arisen as a 
result of the arrangement entered into.61  This test, however, forces the 
Commissioner to predict what the taxpayer would have done if the taxpayer did not 
enter into the specific arrangement, which is subjective in nature and difficult to 
determine by the Commissioner.  
Furthermore, in CIR v Louw62 using the ‘but for’ test the court accepted that in the 
alternative, salaries would have been paid to the taxpayers if the company did not 
allow for loan accounts.63  This is the creation of a notional income which means 
that the taxpayer is taxed on income which in reality is not his.  This is an absurd 
outcome.64 
It would create certainty if the legislature prescribed guidelines as to how a ‘tax 
benefit’ should be determined.  This would prevent the courts from using their own 
interpretation which could prove difficult to use in practice. 
 
Before the avoidance arrangement will attract the application of the GAAR, two 
more requirements have to be met, the first of which is that it must be the sole or 
main purpose of the avoidance arrangement to obtain a tax benefit and it requires 
the presence of an abnormality element. 
 
 
                                                          
55
 14 SATC 184 at 191. 
56
 Ibid. 
57
 Ibid. 
58
 ITC 1625 59 SATC 383. 
59
 59 SATC 383. 
60
 1983 (3) SA 551, 45 SATC 113 at 142-3. 
61
 SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule at 18. 
62
 1983 (3) SA 551, 45 SATC 113 at 142-3. 
63
 Ibid. 
64
 Clegg, D., Stretch, R. 2009. Income Tax in South Africa at 26.3.3 
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5. Sole and main purpose requirement 
 
The third requirement to be met in terms of the GAAR is that the sole or main 
purpose of the avoidance arrangement must be to obtain a tax benefit.  Where this 
is established it constitutes an ‘impermissible avoidance arrangement’.65 
The meaning of the terms ‘sole’ and ‘main’ have been reviewed in previous case law 
and continues to apply in section 80A.   
In SIR v Lourens Erasmus (Edms) Bpk66 the court found:  
“…the word ‘mainly’ establishes a purely quantitative measure of more than 
50%...” 
The court further held that the word ‘solely’ “does not detract from the 
interpretation but differs in meaning as it is the only purpose.”67   
In CIR v King68 the court said that the words ‘the purpose’ meant a “dominant 
purpose’ and not merely a subsidiary purpose. 
The test to determine the ‘sole or main purpose’ use to be a subjective test.69  
Corbett JA70 based his finding on earlier case law.71  Ogilvie Thompson CJ in SIR v 
Geusteyn, Forsyth and Joubert72 and Glen Anil Development Corporation Ltd v SIR73, 
adopted a subjective test  
“in applying that section 103 (1) draws a clear destinction between the 
“effect” of a scheme and the “purpose”thereof…and this virtually rules out 
an interpretation…of an objective connotation.”74 
Corbett JA, in SIR v Gallagher75, further also explained the difference between the 
subjective and objective test: 
‘By an objective test in this context is evidently meant a test which has regard 
rather to the effect of the scheme, objectively viewed, as opposed to a 
subjective test which takes as its criterion the purpose which those carrying 
out the scheme intend to achieve by means of the scheme.’  
                                                          
65
 Section 80A, 80L. 
66
 1996 (4) SA 434 (A). (Cited in De Koker, A.P. 2012. Silke on South African Income Tax. Ch. 25.7E). 
67
 Ibid. 
68
 1947 (2) SA 196 (A) at 206. 
69
 SIR v Gallagher 1978 (2) SA 463 (A), 40 SATC 39 at 48. 
70
 Ibid. 
71
 Cited in De Koker, A.P. 2012. Silke on South African Income Tax. Ch 19.38. 
72
 1971 (3) SA 567 (A). 
73
 1975 (4) SA 715. 
74
 Cited in De Koker, A.P. 2012. Silke on South African Income Tax. Ch 19.38. 
75
 1978 (2) SA 463 (A) at 471B. 
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Section 80A refers to the purpose of the avoidance arrangement itself, as opposed 
to the intention of the parties.  The wording of the new GAAR therefore indicates a 
shift towards an objective test by way of not referring to the purpose of the parties 
as was used in the predecessor. 
The reason behind this change was to resolve an inconsistency which existed under 
section 103(1) as recognised by RC Williams76:  
“…a taxpayer could with impunity enter into a transaction which was 
objectively ’abnormal’ provided that he did not, subjectively, have the sole or 
main purpose of tax avoidance….”    
This was a weakness of the predecessor.  The subjective intention of the parties has 
therefore been removed ‘to create a uniform treatment of identical transactions’.77 
However, section 80G(1) determines that the purpose of the avoidance 
arrangement should be ‘reasonable considered in light of the relevant facts and 
circumstances’, implying that a subjective test should be used.   
It is therefore unclear which test the legislature intended to be used.  If an objective 
test should be used it remains unclear what would be considered admissible and 
how the court will ignore the subjective purpose, seeing as the test requires of the 
Commissioner to consider the surrounding circumstances.78   
Trevor Emslie, Advocate of the High Court of South Africa, correctly alleged that it is 
illogical to use an objective approach and that it should in fact be a subjective test.  
An agreement cannot have a purpose on its own, but rather conveys the purpose 
and intention of the parties to the agreement and therefore it is important to 
consider the intention of the parties involved.   
Where the Commissioner has successfully shown that a tax benefit has been 
obtained by the taxpayer, section 80G provides a rebuttable presumption.  There is 
a presumption that the sole or main purpose of the taxpayer entering into the 
arrangement was to obtain a tax benefit.  In terms of the predecessor the 
Commissioner had to show that the intention of the taxpayer was to obtain a tax 
benefit, however, the taxpayer now bears the onus to prove the contrary.  This was 
altered by the legislature given that the taxpayer could easily escape a tax liability 
where the Commissioner had to determine the subjective intention of the taxpayer.  
The new position places a heavy burden on the taxpayer, since the taxpayer’s 
                                                          
76
 Williams, R.C. 1997. The 1996 Amendments to the General Anti Avoidance section of the Income 
Tax Act. (Cited in SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule at 21). 
77
 SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule at 21. 
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intention does not carry a lot of weight where an objective test is used to determine 
the purpose of the avoidance arrangement.79 
To determine the purpose of an arrangement one should refer to the time of 
implementation and not to the time when it was formulated.80  The purpose of the 
arrangement can change over time, from when it was formulated, to date of 
implementation.81  The variation of the terms of the arrangement could affect the 
purpose.82 
The purpose of an individual step or part of an arrangement could also differ from 
the purpose from of the arrangement as a whole.  Section 103(1) applied the GAAR 
to the whole agreement.83  Section 80A allows the Commissioner to apply GAAR to 
individual steps and parts of the agreement.84  This would be the case where an 
arrangement has a main purpose unconnected to a tax benefit, but a step of the 
arrangement has been inserted principally for its tax effectiveness.85   
Where a taxpayer is presented with two alternative methods of achieving the same 
commercial end result, resulting in different tax consequences, it is considered that, 
irrespective of which method is selected, the ‘main purpose’ of that transaction 
cannot be to obtain a tax benefit.86  This flows from the principle of ‘choice’ 
established in Duke of Westminster v IRC87 by Lord Tomlin and confirmed In CIR v 
Conhage (Pty) Ltd88: 
‘Within the bounds of any anti-avoidance provisions in the relevant 
legislation, a taxpayer may minimise his tax liability by arranging his affairs 
in a suitable manner.  If, for example, the same commercial result can be 
achieved in different ways, he may enter into the type of transaction which 
does not attract tax o  attract less tax.’ 
To exercise the choice principal effectively the main purpose should be to achieve a 
commercial result and not a tax benefit.89  Therefore, where the taxpayer’s main 
purpose is to obtain a tax benefit the GAAR will find application. 
 
                                                          
79
 Clegg, D., Stretch, R. 2012. Income Tax in South Africa. Ch. 26.3.4. 
80
 Clegg, D., Stretch, R. 2012. Income Tax in South Africa. Ch. 26.3.4. 
81
 Ovenstone v SIR 1980 (2) SA 721. (Cited in Emslie, T.S. 2001. Income Tax Cases and Materials at 
945). 
82
 De Koker, A.P. 2012. Silke on South African Income Tax. Ch. 19.39. 
83
 Clegg, D., Stretch, R. 2012. Income Tax in South Africa. Ch. 26.3.4. 
84
 Section 80B. 
85
 Clegg, D., Stretch, R. 2012. Income Tax in South Africa. Ch. 26.3.4. 
86
 Ibid. 
87
 (1936) 51 TLR 467. 
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 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA), 61 SATC 391 at 392. 
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This is based on the view that the GAAR ‘intends only to protect the general 
provisions of the Act from frustration, and not to deny to the taxpayer any right of 
choice between alternatives’.90 
 
Where an impermissible avoidance arrangement has been established there is one 
more requirement that has to be met before the GAAR will be invoked.  It must be 
confirmed that the avoidance arrangement is abnormal.  
6. The Abnormality requirement 
 
The GAAR requires the avoidance arrangement to include an element of 
abnormality as the fourth and last requirement to successfully invoke the GAAR. 
This requirement was retained from the predecessor, despite continued uncertainty 
surrounding the meaning of the term ‘normal’.91   
The current Abnormality element has been expanded and consists of four tainted 
elements of which only one has to be established to invoke the GAAR as listed in 
section 80A: 
 Abnormality regarding means and manner. 
 A lack of commercial substance in whole or in part. 
 Creating abnormal rights or obligations. 
 Leading to the misuse or abuse of the Act. 
The abnormality element retains all conceptual components as contained in the 
predecessor, with the exception that it should now be applied more objectively.92  It 
is suggested that the abnormality element should be applied more objective 
subsequent to the legislature omitting the words in the new GAAR, ‘having regard 
to the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme was 
entered into or carried out’, as contained in its predecessor.93 
The legislature broadened the abnormality element by including a ‘misuse or abuse 
of the Act’ provision.94  This tainted element and the ‘creating abnormal rights and 
obligations’ provision are intended to remedy the well-recognised weaknesses in 
the predecessor and to expand the scope of the GAAR to address as many forms of 
impermissible tax avoidance as possible.95 
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 Section 80A (C)(ii). 
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To determine the existence of an abnormality element the Act differentiates 
between arrangements entered into in the context of business and arrangements 
not entered into in the context of business. 
The first step would therefore be to determine whether an arrangement was 
entered into in the context of business or not, where after only one of the tainted 
elements in the category concerned must be met in order to satisfy the abnormality 
requirement.96 
In the sections following the tainted elements within their relevant contexts will be 
discussed. 
 
6.1. Avoidance arrangement in the context of business 
 
The ‘business context’97 approach makes provision for where an avoidance 
arrangement is entered into in a manner not normal for bona fide business 
purposes,98 or it lacks commercial substance,99 the abnormality requirement will be 
satisfied.  
The terms ‘business context’ and ‘business’, are not defined within the Income Tax 
Act, although a ‘trade’ is defined as including a ‘business’ within the Income Tax 
Act.100  A ‘trade’ is defined as: 
‘every profession, trade, business, employment, calling, occupation or 
venture, including the letting of any property and the use of or the grant of 
permission to use any patent…’101 
It is important to note that carrying on a business is not the same as carrying on a 
trade.  A trade is more widely defined and includes a business.102   
Although no definition is found in the Income Tax Act, relevant tax case law 
provides guideli es to determine the meaning of ‘carrying on a business’.  
In Modderfontein Deep Levels Ltd v Feinstein103 the court held that the meaning of 
‘carrying on a business’ must be determined on the circumstances of each particular 
case: 
‘…No doubt as a rule a trade or a business is carried on for the purpose of 
making a profit, but profit-making is not of the essence of trading…to 
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 Van Schalkwyk, L. 2011. Silke on South African Income Tax. Ch. 25.2 at 730. 
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 Section 80A(a). 
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 Section 80A(a)(i). 
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 Section 80A(a)(ii). 
100
 Section 1. 
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constitute a business there must either be a definite intention at the first act 
to carry on similar acts from time to time if opportunity offers, or the acts 
must be done not twice but successively, with the intention of carrying it on, 
so long as it is thought desirable’. 
Morrison v CIR104 confirmed that ‘carrying on a business’ is a factual question. 
When determining whether someone was ‘carrying on a business’, consideration 
should be given to the intention of the taxpayer, profit and frequency of such act, 
including the requisite for a series of actions to obtain the income.105 
In an unreported case in 1959 the court concluded that the normal commercial 
meaning should be attached to the term ‘business’.106 
The Business purpose- and Commercial substance test will be discussed in sections 
6.1.1 and 6.1.2.   
6.1.1. Abnormality regarding means and manner (Business purpose test) 
This tainted element, found in Section 80A(a)(i), requires an objective approach to 
determine whether the arrangement was entered into or carried out, by means or 
in a manner, which would not normally be employed for bona fide business 
purposes, other than obtaining a tax benefit.107  This entails a comparison between 
the taxpayer’s transaction, and the way in which a similar type of transaction would 
normally be carried out.108 
The test does not require that an arrangement should have a business purpose as 
described, but merely that the method by which the transaction was entered into 
should be normal in a business context.109  
SARS confirms that: 
“…the section does not mandate an enquiry into whether or not the 
particular taxpayer entered into the particular transaction for bona fide 
purposes, but that it necessitates an enquiry into a hypothetical situation:  
whether the manner in which the transaction was entered into ‘would not 
normally be employed’ for bona fide business purposes.”110 
                                                          
104
 (1950) 2 SA 449 (A), 16 SATC 377 at 387-8. 
105
 Zulman, R.H., Stretch, R., Silke J. 2012. Income Tax Practice Manual Commentary. A:B22.  
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 Smith v Anderson (188-) 15 ChD 247 (CA), where the court held that a man who lets portions of 
one building in the circumstances of the present case would not be carrying on the business of 
letting property in the ordinary commercial sense. 
107
 Van Schalkwyk, L. 2011. Silke on South African Income Tax. Ch. 25.2 at 730. 
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 Clegg, D., Stretch, R. 2012. Income Tax in South Africa. Ch. 26.3.5. 
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D Clegg111 correctly submits that it should rather be named the ‘bona fide business 
method test’ as the current description, the ‘business purpose test’ is misleading.  
Where a method is construed as normal business practise, it will therefore fall short 
of the GAAR’s application, irrespective of a tax benefit being obtained.112  
The term ‘bona fide’ is not defined in the Act, but it is a general concept.  The 
recognized judicial meaning is ‘good faith’.  Even when a transaction is entered into 
by means of a bona fide method, the method employed can still be found to be 
abnormal in a business context.113 
It is unclear as to how it will be determined what constitutes normal business 
practice within a complex and diversified business world.  It could be difficult to 
apply this in practice and this is problematic, not only for the taxpayer but also for 
SARS.  In 1986 the Margo commission recognised that where a ‘particular form of 
transaction is widely used for tax avoidance purposes it may gain a commercial 
acceptability’ which would make it normal in the business world.114  This could have 
an adverse effect, surely not intended by the legislature.  In this situation SARS will 
therefore not be able to invoke the GAAR irrespective of the taxpayer’s sole or main 
purpose to avoid tax, thus, in doing so, leaving the GAAR potentially ineffective, like 
its predecessor.115    
A further difficulty raised by the Margo Commission was based on the 
interpretation of the GAAR by the courts:116 
In Hicklin v SIR117 the court found that what may be interpreted as normal as a 
result of the surrounding circumstances of an agreement, may be abnormal in a 
similar agreement in the absence of such circumstances.  The question of normality 
is therefore a factual one and the courts may potentially consider relevant 
circumstances.118  This has the effect of similar transactions being treated 
differently, which was a weakness of the predecessor.  It is still unclear whether this 
weakness will be resolved by the objective test despite the presence of specific 
circumstances, for example where parties to an agreement have a special 
relationship.   
                                                          
111
 Clegg, D., Stretch, R. 2012. Income Tax in South Africa. Ch. 26.3.5. 
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 Meyerowitz, D. 2008. Meyerowitz on Income Tax: Ch. 29.5 at 29-7. 
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 SARS. 2006. Revised Proposals on Tax Avoidance and Section 103 of the Income Tax Act, 1962. 
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However, Trollip JA further noted in the Hicklin’s case that the test for normality is 
whether the transaction was conducted at arm’s length and when conducted 
accordingly it will not create abnormal rights and obligations.119 
The concept of ‘at arm’s length’ was described in Hicklin v SIR120: 
‘It connotes that each party is independent of the other and, in so dealing, 
will strive to get the utmost possible advantage out of the transaction for 
himself…Hence, in at arm’s length agreement the rights and obligations it 
creates are more likely to be regarded as normal than abnormal in the sense 
envisaged by s 103(1)(b)(ii)…’   
 6.1.2. A lack of commercial substance  
The commercial substance test is determined by a general rule contained in section 
80C(1), assisted by a non-exclusive list contained in section 80C(2).  The list contains 
characteristics, indicative of a lack of commercial substance.  Both of which are new 
concepts and expand the scope of the GAAR:121  
6.1.2.1.   General Rule  
Section 80(C)(1) reads: 
‘For purposes of this Part, an avoidance arrangement lacks commercial 
substance if it would result in a significant tax benefit for a party (but for the 
provisions of this Part) but does not have a significant effect upon either the 
business risks or net cash flows of that party apart from any effect 
attributable to the tax benefit that would be obtained but for the provisions 
of this Part.’ 
According to the general rule, an arrangement lacks commercial substance where it 
results in a significant tax benefit without having a significant effect on the business 
risks or net cash flows. 
AP De Koker122 contends that the benefit must be significant in the context of the 
taxpayer’s annual net profit, net assets or even his financial affairs in general. 
The application of the test is challenging as no guidance is provided as to what 
constitutes a ‘significant’ tax benefit.123  It is implied that the term could be defined 
as material or relevant to a specific taxpayer.124  It would be my submission that the 
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legislature should define how a ‘significant’ benefit or effect will be determined to 
create certainty. 
6.1.2.2.   Non-Exhaustive list of Commercial substance indicators 
Section 80(C)(2) reads:  
‘For purposes of this Part, characteristics of an avoidance arrangement that 
are indicative of a lack of commercial substance include but are not limited 
to— 
(a) The legal substance or effect of the avoidance arrangement as a whole is 
inconsistent with, or differs significantly from, the legal form of its 
individual steps; or 
(b) The inclusion or presence of— 
(i) Round trip financing as described in section 80D; or 
(ii)  An accommodating or tax indifferent party as described in section 80E; or 
(iii) Elements that have the effect of offsetting or cancelling each other’. 
The four commercial substance indicators are discussed in section (a) to (d). 
(a) Substance over form 
It is important to understand the ‘substance over form’ concept before analysing 
section 80C(2)(A).   
A distinction must be drawn between the simulation principle and the label 
principle.  The former refers to where parties deliberately conceal or disguise the 
true nature of the transaction, which constitutes a sham.125  The latter refers to 
where parties act in good faith, but attach the wrong label to the transaction.126  
The common law principle that applies in South-Africa, which was challenged in the 
case of SARS v NWK Ltd127, determines that a transaction will not be regarded as 
simulated, if the parties genuinely intended their contract to have effect in 
accordance with its tenor.128  It applies even if the transaction is devised solely for 
the purpose of avoiding tax.129 
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In the Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Randles Brothers & Hudson Ltd130 the 
court held that: 
‘A transaction devised for that purpose, if the parties honestly intend it to 
have the effect according to its tenor, is interpreted by the court according to 
its tenor and then the only question is whether so interpreted, it falls within 
or without the prohibition or tax.’ 
This principle of law has prevailed since the decision in Zandberg v Van Zyl131 which 
concluded that: 
 ‘…the court must be satisfied there is a real intention, definitely 
ascertainable, which differs from the simulated intention’.   
This was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal multiple times.132  
In 2010 Lewis JA seemingly created a new requirement for simulated transactions in 
the recent case SARS v NWK Ltd133: 
‘In my view the test to determine simulation cannot simply be whether there 
is an intention to give effect to a contract in accordance with its terms…The 
test should … go further, and require an examination of the commercial sense 
of the transaction: of its real substance and purpose. If the purpose of the 
transaction is only to achieve an object that allows the evasion of tax or of a 
peremptory law, then it will be regarded as simulated.’134 
Lewis JA created an objective test.  The test does not focus on the intention of the 
parties but examines the commercial sense of the transaction based on a tax 
benefit.135  The mere fact that a transaction was implemented in accordance with 
its terms would not preclude a finding that it was a sham.136  This is a direct 
contradiction of the Practice Note No 5 of 1 April 1987 which determines that: 
“A taxpayer who has carried out a legitimate tax avoidance scheme, i.e. who 
has arranged his affairs so as to minimise his tax liability, in a manner which 
does not involve fraud, dishonesty, misrepresentation or other actions 
designed to mislead the Commissioner will have met his duties and 
obligations under the Act…”137  
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This could therefore lead to agreements being struck down as shams where there is 
no ‘apparent commercial purpose’, although parties were acting in good faith, and 
lacked the intention to disguise any element of the arrangement.138  This was clearly 
not the intention of the legislature.  
Traditionally SARS found it difficult to prove ‘substance over form’ where 
agreements were implemented in accordance with their form.  The ability to attack 
transactions in terms of this doctrine139 has possibly been increased by the NWK-
judgement if the courts decide to apply the objective test.  It would be easier for 
SARS to succeed than where the finding is dependent on the biased and subjective 
intention of the party. 
However, the findings of the NWK-judgement were not established by using the 
objective test, but rather the common law principle whereby one looks at the 
intention of the parties.140  EB Broomberg141 therefore concludes correctly that the 
‘new law’ was made obiter and not binding on other courts in the future.  The 
common law approach therefore still prevails. 
In terms of section 80C(2)(A) it is an indication of a ‘lack of commercial substance’ 
and therefore abnormal, where the legal substance or effect of an avoidance 
arrangement as a whole differs from the legal form of its steps.   
SARS142 directs that the term ‘effect’ includes ‘economic, commercial and practical 
effect of an arrangement. 
This provision draws upon a precedent in both the UK and the US, adopting an 
‘unblinkered’ approach to complex multi-step composite transactions and 
expanding the scope of the constricted common law doctrine of substance over 
form.143 
It is unclear how a legal substance or a commercial effect of the entire arrangement 
could be compared to a single step in the arrangement.  This could not have been 
the intention of the legislature.  Several commercial end results cannot be achieved 
through a single step and this provision accordingly puts all multi-step 
arrangements potentially at risk.144   
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RC Williams145 suggests that before invoking the GAAR, the Commissioner should 
first attempt to halt an arrangement by means of the common law principle.  Firstly, 
the sections in GAAR are found to be more complex with more requirements to be 
satisfied and secondly, the common law principle would even apply in the absence 
of the intention to obtain a tax benefit.146  The common law remedy is therefore 
more powerful than the provision found in the GAAR.  However, the GAAR can be 
raised in the alternative.147   
(b) Round trip financing 
The concept of ‘round trip financing’ is similar to the concept of ‘round robin 
financing’, found in Australia and ‘circular cash flows’, as used in the United 
States.148 
Section 80D appears to ensure a wide application.  However, the definition 
provided seems to limit the application of section 80D.149 
Round trip financing refers to avoidance arrangements in which150 
o Funds are transferred between or among parties; and 
o The transfer would 
 Result in a direct or indirect tax benefit; and 
 Significantly reduce, offset or eliminate any business risk by any 
connected party 
In terms of section 80D(2) the provision will apply irrespective of whether round 
trip amounts can be traced back, the timing or sequence thereof and the means or 
manner it was transferred in.  The fact that the flow of funds takes place during 
different assessment yea s is therefore irrelevant.151 
The term ‘funds’ includes not only cash and cash equivalents but also any right or 
obligation to receive or pay the same.152  The term would therefore cover the 
cession of monetary amounts but does not include non-monetary fungibles.153  
SARS154 confirms that it includes promissory notes, amounts paid in foreign 
currencies and derivative financial instruments where the obligations are settled in 
cash. 
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The concept ‘round trip financing’ was discussed in the case Ramsey v IRC155: 
‘Although sums of money, sometimes considerable, are supposed to be 
involved in individual transactions, the taxpayer does not have to put his 
hands in his pocket’. 
Section 80D supposedly should only apply where money is passed between parties, 
although the funds simply travel in a circle.  Everyone is therefore restored to the 
positions held prior to the start of the avoidance arrangement.156  However, it is 
submitted by EB Broomberg157, that almost all arrangements will involve the 
transfer of funds.  It could potentially have the effect of all fund transfers being 
regarded as round trip financing in terms of the phrasing of section 80D and creates 
uncertainty.  
D Clegg158 correctly it is submitted, suggests that the round trip financing provision 
is an example of ‘offsetting or cancelling elements’ and therefore a duplication of 
section 80C(2)(b)(i) as discussed in section 6.1.2.2(d).  Both these provisions results 
in offsetting of steps and results in disguising the real effect and outcome of an 
arrangement.      
(c) Accommodating or tax-indifferent parties 
Section 80C(2)(b)(ii) refers to the presence of an ‘accommodating or tax 
indifferent party’.   
Section 80E provides a description of the term ‘accommodating or tax 
indifferent parties’: 
‘80E(1) A party to an avoidance arrangement is an accommodating or 
tax indifferent party if - 
(a) Any amount derived by the party in connection with the 
avoidance   arrangement is either: 
(i) Not subject to normal tax; or 
(ii) Significantly offset by either any expenditure or loss incurred by 
the party in connection with the avoidance arrangement or any 
assessed loss of the party; and 
(b) Either 
(i) As a direct or indirect result of the participation of that party 
involves an amount that would have: 
(aa) been included in the gross income (including the recoupment of 
any amount) or receipts or accruals of a capital nature of another 
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party would be included in the gross income or receipts and 
accruals of a capital nature of that party;  
(bb) constituted a non-deductible expenditure or loss in the hands of 
another party would be treated as a deductible expenditure by 
that other party; 
(cc) constituted revenue in the hands of another party would be 
treated as capital by that other party; or 
(dd) given rise to taxable income to another party would either be not 
included in gross income or be exempt from normal tax; or 
(ii)           the participation of that party directly or indirectly involves a 
prepayment by any other party. 
Section 80E(2) further provides for the inclusion of parties not defined as a  
‘connected persons’ in section 1 of the Income Tax Act.  
To limit this tainted element the legislature has included two safe harbours: 
o The amounts derived by that party are also subject to foreign taxes equal 
to at least two-thirds of the amount of tax that they would be subject to in 
South Africa.159  The reasoning for this exception is to counter double 
taxation.  This could be problematic for the taxpayer as it requires of him to 
have extensive knowledge of the relevant foreign tax laws.160 
 
o That party continues to engage directly in substantive trading activities in 
connection with the avoidance arrangement for a period of at least 
18months161 and provided those activities are attributable to a place of 
business that would constitute a foreign business establishment for the 
purposes of section 9D162.163  The phrase ‘substantive trading activities’ has 
not been defined in the Act164 and it is unclear what activities will be 
included.  Having regard for the fact that this can differ from taxpayer to 
taxpayer, the Commissioner should indicate which factors will be looked at.  
Furthermore the complicated test and exceptions impose a significant 
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burden on the taxpayer to adduce facts in respect of the other foreign 
party’s business activities that may well be unknown to the taxpayer.165 
In terms of section 80F the Commissioner may treat connected persons in relation 
to each other and accommodating or tax-indifferent parties as one and the same 
person and disregard any accommodating or tax-indifferent parties.  The 
consequence of this section is that any transaction between connected persons 
with a tax-haven is potentially subject to the application of the GAAR unless the 
taxpayer can prove that the sole or main purpose of the avoidance arrangement 
was not to obtain a tax benefit.166 
(d) Elements that offset or cancel each other 
In terms of Section 80C(2)(b)(iii), where elements have the effect of offsetting or 
cancelling each other, it indicates a ‘lack of commercial substance’. 
This concept seems to draw on a precedent in the UK associated with the ‘fiscal 
nullity’ doctrine derived at in Ramsey Ltd v IRC.167  The Ramsey principle says that 
where steps with no commercial purpose are inserted to avoid a tax liability the 
steps are to be disregarded for fiscal purposes.168 
The provision attempts to flush out intention lly misleading steps inserted in 
complex schemes.  An example is the extinction of rights and obligations by way of 
confusion that occurred in SARS v NWK.169  According to a signed agreement, NWK 
had borrowed capital of R96 million from a subsidiary of FNB Bank, to be repaid 
after 5 years by delivering maize.170  The interest was payable over the 5 year period 
of the loan as calculated on the R96 million loan, however the economic effect of 
the entire arrangement resulted in NWK only receiving a loan of R50 million.171  The 
Commissioner correctly disallowed the interest deductible from income on the 
grounds that it was a sham and in the alternative, tax avoidance.172  This was a 
complex multi-step arrangement leading to the cancelling of rights and obligations.  
(e) More indicators of a lack of commercial substance 
SARS173 indicates that the above listed tainted elements are not an exhaustive list 
and lists more examples likely to be considered: 
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o Anticipated pre-tax profit insignificant in comparison to value of the 
anticipated tax benefit; 
o Paying more or less than market value for assets or services; 
o Inconsistent characterisation by the parties; 
o Significant book or tax differences; 
o Unnecessary steps or complexity; 
o High transaction costs; 
o Fee variation clause or other provisions; and 
o Timing and duration or of arrangement or failure to adhere to normal 
business practices. 
 
6.2. Avoidance arrangement in a non-business context 
The ‘non-business context’ test contained in section 80A(b), refers to an avoidance 
arrangement carried out by means not normally employed for a bona fide purpose 
other than obtaining a tax benefit. 
Refer to section 6.1 where these elements are discussed and views expressed apply 
equally. 
The only difference between section 80A(a) and section 80A(b) is that the latter 
does not refer to a ‘business’ purpose and consequently any bona fide purpose will 
suffice.174  
There is no enquiry into a ‘lack of commercial substance’ as this would be 
inappropriate in a non-business context but the use of ‘normal’ in the provision 
indicates it entails a comparison with a hypothetical scenario.175  
6.3. Avoidance arrangement in any context 
Section 80A(c)(i) reads:  
‘Where an avoidance arrangement has created rights or obligations that would 
not normally be created between persons dealing at arm’s length’.  
And section 80A(c)(ii) reads: 
‘Where an avoidance arrangement would result directly or indirectly in the 
misuse or abuse of the provisions of this Act’. 
Both these requirements would be applicable in a business context, a non-business 
context and any other context not covered by the Act specifically. 
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6.3.1. Creating abnormal rights and obligations 
Section 80A(c)(i) reads 
‘Where an avoidance arrangement has created rights or obligations that 
would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm’s length’. 
This tainted element existed in the predecessor, with the exception of considering 
‘…the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question’, therefore 
suggesting that an objective test has been created in the new GAAR. 
The test for whether an avoidance arrangement has created rights or obligations 
not normally created between parties dealing at arm’s length is a factual inquiry, 
considered against the hypothetical normal transaction.176 
The concept ‘at arm’s length’ as described in Hicklin v SIR177was discussed in section 
6.1.1 as where both parties strive for the utmost advantage.178 
CIR v Louw179 established that where parties to a transaction are related, one 
should ask whether in the context of that type of relationship, each party was 
seeking to extract the greatest possible advantage for himself.  AP de Koker180 
correctly it is submitted, suggests that the courts will, in all likelihood, follow the 
same test in regard to section 80A(c)(i) despite the test being of an objective 
nature. 
However, in view of the fact that the Commissioner has to show on a balance of 
probabilities that the arrangement created abnormal rights and obligations, EB 
Broomberg181 held that where surrounding circumstances are taken into account, 
the Commissioner is not likely to succeed.  It is therefore still unclear whether this 
tainted element will contribute to enhancing the scope of the GAAR.  It will be 
dependent on how strictly the objective test is applied by the courts.   
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6.3.2. Misuse or abuse of the provision of the Act 
Section 80A(c)(ii)  reads: 
‘Where an avoidance arrangement would result directly or indirectly in the 
misuse or abuse of the provisions of this Act’. 
This provision was inserted to protect the general provisions of the Act from 
frustration.182 
The concept of ‘misuse or abuse’ is new to the South African GAAR and the 
rationale behind this insertion was to reinforce the modern approach to the 
interpretation of tax statutes “in order to find the meaning that harmonizes the 
wording, object, spirit and purpose of the provisions of the Income Tax Act”.183  
There are, however, no guidelines in the Act nor has it been judicially considered.  
Therefore it has to be seen in the context of existing South African legal principles 
and guidance found in foreign jurisdictions.184 
It originates from section 245(4) in the Canadian Federal Income Tax Act:185  
“For greater certainty, subsection 245(2) does not apply to a transaction 
where it may reasonably be considered that the transaction would not result 
directly or indirectly in a misuse of the provision of this Act or an abuse 
having regard to the provisions of this Act” 
This section is used to limit the GAAR found in the Canadian section 245(2) which 
empowers the Commissioner to override unambiguous provisions which creates 
uncertainty and causes restric ive judicial interpretation.186  The Canadian GAAR 
may therefore not be applied where a transaction does not result in the misuse or 
abuse of the provisions of the Act.187 
The South African legislature has drafted the phrase in a positive language rather 
than negative, as found in the Canadian section 145(4).188  The South African 
provision therefore has the opposite effect and makes provision for the application 
of the GAAR when it results in the misuse or abuse of the provisions of the Act.  This 
has stripped the GAAR of any limitations189 and created an excessively broad GAAR 
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whereby SARS can override provisions of the Act.  EB Broomberg190 states that the 
new misuse and abuse test will only effect limited transactions, particularly 
transactions that qualify for tax benefits in terms of a provision of the Act.  An 
example is the tax benefits introduced by the Government to induce taxpayers to 
invest capital towards development of poor areas.191  In this instance the purpose 
would most probably be the tax benefit, which will satisfy the requirements of the 
GAAR.192  This could potentially result in a disturbance of the equilibrium between 
the power of the fiscus and a taxpayer conducting his business.193  This section 
could possibly put the GAAR in the same predicament as its predecessor before the 
CIR v King-judgment194 when its ‘ambit was considered to be too wide’,195 which 
could result in a narrow and restricted interpretation of the GAAR by the courts.196  
EB Broomberg alleged that to determine whether a provision of the Act has been 
misused or abused, the purpose of such provision needs to be determined, which 
creates a further problem.197  In Canada, the courts make use of the textual, 
contextual and purposive method of interpreting statutes irrespective of the 
wording of a provision being clear, certain and unambiguous.198  This makes it easy 
to apply the misuse and abuse provision and determine the purpose of the 
provision.   The interpretation methods used in relation to the South African tax law 
differs considerably from the method used in Canada as concluded in Cape Brandy 
syndicate v CIR199: 
“In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said.  There is no 
room for any intendment.  There is no equity about a tax.  There is no 
presumption as to a tax.  Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied.  
One can only look fairly at the language used.”   
Where the meaning of the words of the Income Tax Act is clear and unambiguous, 
the courts therefore do not look into the purpose of the provision.  It is therefore 
unclear how the courts will apply the misuse and abuse provision, considering the 
interpretation methods entrenched in the South African tax law.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
“The short-term behaviour of aggressive tax avoidance and evasion by 
multinationals is likely to result in a backlash and a retreat to protectionism 
which would make the world poorer.”200 
Tax avoidance by taxpayers is a serious problem as it leads to the ‘erosion of the tax 
base’201 and promotes unfair sharing of taxes.  It is therefore desirable for countries 
to employ a GAAR to successfully prevent tax avoidance and to enforce the law.    
However, for a GAAR to be effective, it is just as important to have a clear and 
simply drafted rule that provides the taxpayer, SARS and the judicial system with 
certainty.  In the recent foreign ruling, Vodafone International Holdings B.V v Union 
of India & Anr., the court held that:  
‘Certainty is integral to the rule of law.  Certainty and stability form the basic 
foundation of any fiscal system.  Tax policy certainty is crucial for taxpayer 
(including foreign investors) to make rational economic choices in the most 
efficient manner…’202   
This dissertation was aimed at exploring the effectiveness of the current GAAR in 
comparison to its predecessor, by analysing the requirements as set out in section 
80A, read together with relevant sections. 
In terms of section 80A the following four requirements must be met before the 
GAAR can be invoked: 
 There must be an arrangement entered into on or after 2 November 
2006; 
 The arrangement results in a tax benefit which constitutes an 
avoidance arrangement; 
 The sole or main purpose of the avoidance arrangement is to obtain 
a tax benefit; and 
 Any one of the tainted elements must be present to indicate 
abnormality: 
 Abnormality regarding means or manner. 
 A lack of commercial substance. 
 Creating abnormal rights or obligations. 
 Leading to the misuse or abuse of the Act. 
Apparent from the requirements is that the legislature implemented various new 
concepts, creating confusion and uncertainty regarding the interpretation and 
application of the GAAR:   
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The legislature expanded the GAAR by employing a detailed definition of an 
‘arrangement’.  The definition is wide enough to apply the GAAR to a single tax 
driven step forming part of an arrangement, regardless of the dominant purpose of 
the whole arrangement.  This approach creates uncertainty and therefore it is 
submitted that the legislature should limit the application of this definition to steps 
which are not commercially essential to achieve an intended end result.203   
Where the existence of an arrangement has been established the GAAR requires 
the Commissioner to determine the existence of a tax benefit.  However, the GAAR 
does not prescribe a test to determine the existence of a tax benefit.  The ‘but for’ 
method established and implemented by the courts could have the absurd outcome 
of a taxpayer being taxed on income which in reality is not his.204  The ‘but for’ test 
is subjective, making it challenging for the Commissioner to prove the existence of a 
tax benefit.  
Subsequent to the Commissioner showing the existence of a tax benefit, section 
80A suggests the use of an objective test to determine the purpose of an 
arrangement, deviating from the problematic subjective test traditionally 
recognised.  However, when section 80A is read together with section 80G(1), 
which indicates that surrounding circumstances should be considered, it is unclear 
whether the legislature intended it to be a subjective or an objective test.  If the 
legislature intended for an objective test to be used, it remains unclear which 
surrounding circumstances would be admissible and how the court will succeed in 
applying an objective test when taking into account subjective circumstances.205  
The burden of showing the purpose has shifted from the Commissioner to the 
taxpayer.  This change removed the weakness found in the predecessor where the 
Commissioner had the difficult task of showing that the taxpayer’s intention was to 
obtain a tax benefit.  However, the new position makes it difficult for the taxpayer 
to resist an attack where the taxpayer’s intention does not carry a lot of weight.206  
This creates uncertainty for the taxpayer. 
For the GAAR to be successfully invoked the arrangement has to be abnormal.  A 
weakness of the predecessor was found in the abnormality requirement.  It was 
alleged that where a method or transaction is widely used, it becomes normal and 
commercially acceptable.  In this situation SARS will not be able to invoke the GAAR 
irrespective of the taxpayer’s sole or main purpose to avoid tax.  Despite the 
lingering uncertainty, the legislature retained the tainted element in the current 
GAAR without further defining the term ‘normal’ and thus, in doing so, has left the 
GAAR potentially ineffective, like its predecessor. 
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In terms of section 80C(2)(A) it is an indication of a ‘lack of commercial substance’ 
and therefore abnormal, where the legal substance or effect of an avoidance 
arrangement as a whole differs from the legal form of its steps.  It was submitted 
that several commercial end results cannot be achieved through a single step and 
this provision accordingly puts all multi-step arrangements potentially at risk, yet 
again creating uncertainty.207    
It was further submitted that the round trip financing provision, indicating 
abnormality, is an example of ‘offsetting or cancelling elements’ and therefore a 
duplication of section 80C(2)(b)(i) as discussed in section 6.1.2.2(d).208  Both these 
provisions result in the offsetting of steps and disguising the real effect and 
outcome of an arrangement.  It was submitted that the Commissioner should 
remove the duplication as it creates confusion. 
When determining whether abnormal rights and obligations were created, the 
legislature once more deviated from the traditional subjective test approach.  It 
could prove to be problematic to apply an objective test to determine whether the 
parties are dealing at arm’s length where parties are, for example, related. 
The legislature implemented a new ‘misuse or abuse of the provisions of the Act’ 
provision to show abnormality.  This provision allows SARS to override provisions of 
the Act which leads to uncertainty for the taxpayer.  This could possibly result in the 
GAAR’s scope being construed as being too wide, with the courts implementing a 
narrow and restricted interpretation.209  It is also unclear how this provision will find 
application, when considering the South African interpretation methods.210 
From the research and the concerns as discussed above, it is evident that the South 
African GAAR is a complex piece of legislation, which results in much uncertainty.  
Although the new GAAR has succeeded in removing most of the weaknesses found 
in its predecessor, it is fair to conclude that the legislature has failed to provide a 
more effective GAAR, when taking into consideration the difficulties in applying it in 
practice, its wide scope, undefined terms essential to its application and uncertainty 
surrounding the interpretation of the requirements.  A great deal is left open to 
interpretation by the courts and as suggested, where the GAAR is construed as 
being too wide it could result in a narrow interpretation.  South Africa needs a 
clearly drafted and simple GAAR that can be easily upheld by SARS and the courts, 
one which, unlike the current GAAR, does not create any loopholes to escape 
accountability for tax avoidance as a result of complexity and uncertainty.   
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